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Abstract
During the 2003-2006 period, subjective health status in Chinese rural areas improved.
We used a unique household longitudinal survey to analyze how the introduction of a public
insurance system has contributed to the change. This program is based on a doubly voluntary
process: counties decide to launch, then households decide to subscribe. We disentangle two
channels of influence of the insurance: the insurance effect of the coverage and a general
equilibrium effect on all residents in the insurance-adopting counties. The empirical findings
include, first, a positive extensive margin: individuals feel better about their health status
when covered by the NCMS. However, there is no intensive margin: an individual’s self-
assessed health status does not improve with the number of years enrolled in the program.
Second, we find a positive general equilibrium effect of introducing the NCMS program on
non-participants in NCMS counties. This effect accumulates over time.
Keywords: Subjective health, Rural China, Health insurance, New Cooperative Medical
Scheme.
JEL Classification: D82, H52, I18.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the self-reported health of the Chinese rural population has worsened. The
percentage who declare themselves to be in bad health rose by about 15 percentage points between
1991 and 2004 (Milcent, 2012). Over the same period, there has been a drastic decline in the
utilization of health care (Bloom and Gu, 1997; Hesketh and Zhu, 1997; Gao et al., 2001). A
common explanation of these two phenomena is the rise in the price of health care and the absence
of a health insurance market. One of the major causes of impoverishment in rural China is now
the financial hardship caused by ill health (Liu, 2006). In 2003, 80% of rural residents in China did
not have any health insurance (Wagstaff et al., 2009). In the same year, a new health-insurance
system, the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), was introduced in rural areas. By 2009,
more than 94% of eligible rural residents (833 million people) were covered by the NCMS (China
Statistical Yearbook 2010). This paper uses a unique household longitudinal survey which allows
us to distinguish both i) the effect of the health-insurance market on self-assessed health (SAH),
and ii) the effect of insurance coverage on SAH.
Individuals do of course have some idea about their own health status, but this knowledge
depends on their medical know-how and the frequency with which they go to the hospital or to
the doctor. The need of individuals for healthcare is determined by their objective health, which
is only partially known to them. The perception that individuals have of their own health does
not determine their need for healthcare but it determines their demand for healthcare access.
The role of public insurance is to improve the affordability of healthcare, and allow individuals
to fulfill their demand for healthcare access without, or at least with less regard to, their budget
constraints. Hence, public insurance is a political tool which responds to healthcare demand based
on individuals’ subjective health. The NCMS program offers a quasi-natural experiment which
allows us to address a novel question: How does the introduction of a health insurance program
change individuals’ views of their subjective health?
Moreover, insurance has the effect of modifying the individual’s perceived health, via greater
use of healthcare. On the one hand, we expect the individual’s health to improve, via the greater
use of healthcare associated with looser budget constraints; on the other hand, more frequent
healthcare use should also give individuals more accurate knowledge of their objective health
status, which will also affect their perceived health. Moreover, the presence of health insurance
may also affect the supply of healthcare. As individuals become less budget-constrained, the
2
supply of healthcare may become both better-quality and more expensive. As such, the mere
presence of health insurance may have an impact on the healthcare demand of those who are
not covered by the insurance. The budget constraints of the latter may be affected because of
these changes in the supply of healthcare; a resulting effect on their subjective health may then
be expected. Last, as the use of healthcare rises, it is likely that a greater amount of information
about health will circulate between individuals. These assumptions will be tested in this paper.
Although the NCMS has been widely seen as one of the most important reforms in rural China
since the economic reforms of the 1980s, the systematic empirical evidence on this issue is very
limited, with a noticeable exception in Lei and Lin’s (2009) finding of no significant improvement
in self-reported health status or sickness or injury in the past four weeks after families acquired
insurance coverage. Similar to the studies on public health insurance programs in other countries,
the few papers that have evaluated the NCMS program have all focused on its effects on healthcare
utilization or the healthcare spending of households. However, it is not clear whether more (less)
healthcare utilization means better (worse) self-assessment of health status,1 not to mention that
evidence in the literature on the effect of the NCMS on healthcare utilization is actually mixed
(Wagstaff et al., 2009; Lei and Lin, 2009; Bai and Wu, 2010). Despite the fact that the main
purpose of the NCMS is to improve the affordability of healthcare services, empirical evaluations
have not found solid evidence of a decrease in out-of-pocket health expenditures (per visit) owing
to the NCMS (Wagstaff et al., 2009; Lei and Lin, 2009; Bai and Wu, 2010). It has been suggested
that suppliers may have exploited the benefit by increasing the price of healthcare services or
increasing the number of visits or unnecessary tests or procedures for each patient, resulting in
an increase in total healthcare expenses. This increase can also affect both people’s health status
and their assessment of it. For example, a decrease in the affordability of healthcare for the
uninsured may have a negative effect on their views of their health status. Moreover, the NCMS
program affects not only insured families, but also non-participants in the counties that have
introduced the program (labeled as NCMS counties). We call these effects general equilibrium
effects. These generally do not directly result from better healthcare. There are also other general
equilibrium effects, including a reinforcement of awareness of health risks when the government
tries to convince people to participate to the program, the spillover of health-related knowledge,
1On one hand, more healthcare utilization can lead to better objective and hence subjective health status; on the
other hand, more utilization of the healthcare may lead to more awareness or anxiety of latent diseases (Koszegi,
2001).
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and peer-comparison effects when exogenous shocks affect the health status of individuals in the
community.
Due to the fact that the NCMS has been rolled out sequentially in a series of counties,2 and
that counties and households decide whether to participate voluntarily, three types of households
can be distinguished in each year: the insured, non-participants in villages within a NCMS county,
and the non-exposed in villages within counties that have not launched the program (labeled as
non-NCMS counties). Three effects of the program can be identified after addressing potential
selection biases: the insurance effect, which works only on the insured, by comparing the insured
with non-participants; the gross effect of the program, by comparing the insured with the non-
exposed; and the spillover effect, by comparing non-participants with the non-exposed. Previous
studies have focused on either the insurance effect or the gross effect of the program: our paper
distinguishes between them.
This paper draws upon a unique dataset that combines a longitudinal survey carried out in
rural China (National Fixed-Point Survey, or NFS) from 2003 to 2006 and a household survey on
the NCMS that we conducted with a subsample of the 2006 round of the RFPS. The way the
NCMS was introduced provides a quasi-natural experiment which can be used to examine how
this public insurance program changed people’s self-assessment of health. Nevertheless, because
county enrollment is not completely random and participation is voluntary, the main challenge of
the study is selection bias among both counties/villages and households. To deal with selection
bias, we combined a matching method with the difference-in-difference framework. We found,
first of all, that individuals feels better about their health status when they are covered by the
NCMS. However, there is no additional gain in self-assessed health status with additional years of
enrolment in the program. Second, we find a positive general equilibrium effect of the introduction
of the NCMS program on non-participants in the NCMS county, which accumulates over time.
Third, besides the insurance program, household composition (family size, number of young and
old members) and socio-economic status (income, occupation, and education) also have strong
effects on self-evaluated health status.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the literature and describes the
Chinese context; Section 3 describes the data and gives preliminary statistics; Section 4 explains
the econometric strategy; Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2A county is composed of villages
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2 Literature Review and Chinese Context
2.1 The New Rural Community Medical System (NCMS)
Along with the economic reforms of the 1980s came the dissolution of the rural Cooperative
Medical System, and illness emerged as a leading cause of poverty in rural China. The high
cost of healthcare has deterred many families from obtaining necessary healthcare. In response,
the Chinese government started pilot programs of the New Cooperative Medical System in 2003.
NCMS programs have several key features: 1) the program is targeted at rural residents;3 2)
participation is voluntary but must be at the household level; 3) participants are required to pay
flat-rate premiums, but their contributions are heavily subsidized by governments; 4) the programs
mainly reimburse large expenses so as to ease the economic burden resulting from catastrophic
disease and alleviate illness-caused poverty; 5) the programs are operated at the county level rather
than the township or village level. The primary goal of the NCMS is to reduce impoverishment
resulting from illness and improve the affordability of healthcare (Central Committee of CPC,
2002). Local governments have been granted autonomy to design, implement and supervise the
programs.
Participation in NCMS insurance is voluntary but the unit of participation is the household.
There is reason to assume that household subscriptions are based on the average health status of
members of the household, but not that they are based on every member of the household having
a poor health status: the system thus reduces adverse selection bias. However, although rural
inhabitants are required to participate as household units in order to reduce adverse selection,
the elementary conclusion drawn from previous studies is that the system cannot prevent adverse
selection (Wagstaff et alii, 2007). In this paper, we control for household selection bias.
While local governments have some discretion over the level of financing of the program, the
standard in 2003 was for each participating household to pay at least 10 RMB (about e1 and
about $1.2) for each household member every year, with the local government providing more than
10 RMB for each person per year. The central government would also match with 10 RMB per
year for each beneficiary living in the central and western provinces. As of 2006, while individual
contributions generally remained at the existing level, subsidies from local and central government
increased (Wagstaff et al 2007). NCMS insurance mainly provides financial risk protection to
3The program will also be offered in urban districts and county-level cities that include rural residents.
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patients with catastrophic health problems. Many services—particularly outpatient care—are not
covered, deductibles are high, ceilings are low, and coinsurance rates are high.
There are more than 2800 rural counties in China. The NCMS pilot program began in 310
rural counties in 2003. It expanded to 617 counties in 2005, 1451 counties in 2006—i.e., 50.7%
of the total number of counties—and started to spread across the country in 2007. By the end
of June 2007, the program had expanded to cover 84.9% of all rural counties and 82.8% of all
rural residents. It has covered the whole rural population since 2010. Provincial and county
governments retain considerable discretion over the details of the pilots, including the placement
of the pilot program.
In fact, NCMS pilot counties were not randomly selected. Instead, a complex set of criteria,
including local interest and capacity, level of economic development, and the status of the delivery
system were considered. The voluntary nature of NCMS raises concerns about an adverse selection
that may represent a serious threat to the financial sustainability of the NCMS. In this paper, we
control for the county selection bias: in other words, we control for the effect of living in a county
selected to have an NCMS on self-assessed health (SAH).
Along with the NCMS, local governments provide some supporting policies, such as improve-
ments in rural healthcare (delivery) networks and health service provision, the strengthening of
pharmaceutical governance, and supply chain construction. These improve the quality and delivery
of healthcare service and also benefit families who choose not to participate the NCMS. Therefore,
the adoption of the NCMS program by the county may have a positive effect on healthcare access
for both the NCMS-insured and the NCMS-uninsured.
NCMS insurance programs make healthcare services accessible to those who were previously
not able to afford them due to not being covered by any insurance scheme. As a result, providers
have a greater population of potential patients. According to the theorical literature, these health-
care providers may have an incentive to increase the price of their healthcare services to maximize
profits to the greatest extent compatible with the continued financial viability for patients of being
treated in their facilities. Feldstein (1970) showed that physicians raise their fees when insurance
becomes more extensive—i.e., when a large part of the population comes to be covered by health
insurance. Chiu (1997) uses a formal model to show that the introduction of insurance increases
the equilibrium price of healthcare. In such cases, it is uncertain whether or not insurance will
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reduce the financial burden of sick people. Chiu (1997) shows that if the supply of healthcare is
sufficiently price-inelastic, this increase in price always leads to a reduction in consumer welfare.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data combines the results of the longitudinal Rural Fixed-Point Survey (RFPS), carried out
between 2003 and 2006, and those of a supplementary household survey aimed at evaluating the
NCMS. The RFPS has been carried out each year since 1980s under the responsibility of the
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. Over the years 2003-2006, the same households were surveyed,
with weekly book accounting recorded by these households as the primary information source.
The sample was selected on the basis of a multi-stage stratified random sampling strategy. The
2006 round covers 26 provinces and 19,488 households. It provides information on individual
demographics, including health status, and household characteristics, including income and ex-
penditures.4 The supplementary survey was conducted by Tsinghua University in May 2007. It
surveyed a subsample of the 2006 round of the RFPS, collecting detailed information about the
time when a county and a household enrolled in the NCMS.
The final sample excludes some outliers, such as households who have exited the NCMS or who
participated in some cooperative insurance program between 1993 and 2002. Also excluded are
households who purchased commercial insurance in 2007. The final sample includes 520 villages,
17,715 households and 71,866 individuals over the 4-year sample period.
Table 1 shows the participation rates of counties and households between 2003 and 2006. The
percentage of our sample counties enrolled in the program increased over the years, from about
16% in 2003 to about 77% in 2006. Similarly, the enrollment of individuals also increased over
the years, from 9% in 2003 to 72% in 2006. These numbers are consistent with the national
data (Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2010). In the villages within counties which had launched the
NCMS (called NCMS counties), the majority of households participated in the program, with
the participation rate increasing from 64% in 2003 to 95% in 2006. Moreover, most households
4There are quite a few mistakes in the identification code used to track individuals and households. We used
conservative rules based on individual’s age, sex, and education to match individuals and households over years.
If more than half of the household members could not be matched across two years, we excluded the household
from our sample. Altogether, we deleted around 8% households from our sample due to the inconsistency of the
identification code.
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started to participate in the first year that their county launched the program—the participation
rate by county in the year following the launch of the program was 64% in 2003 and 96% in 2006.
Nevertheless, these numbers also indicate that quite a few households chose not to participate in
the program or delayed in participation. Over the four years from 2003 to 2006, about 12.8% of
households in NCMS counties did not participate.
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics on self-reported health status. It is based on the
answer to the question ”How do you feel about your health status?” and there were five options:
Excellent, Good, Fair, Bad, Very bad. As can be seen in the table, more than half of the sample
felt excellent about their health, while about 12% of individuals reported fair or worse health.
Over the years 2003-2006, the trend in the number of people who felt excellent was positive.
Average SAH went from Good to Excellent. Table 2 also relates the subjective health status to
enrollment status in the NCMS. The results highlight that both the insured and non-participants
experienced an improvement in health status over the period studied. In fact, non-participants
experienced even greater increases in subjective health than the insured. In contrast, the non-
exposed experienced a deterioration in subjective health. However, this might result from dynamic
selection, as it is possible that people who continue not to participate are those with excellent
health, and that villages in counties which continue to be excluded from the NCMS program are
those with bad average health.
Table 3, Column (4) gives preliminary statistics on individual, household and village variables
on the whole sample (2003-2006). An inhabitant with no education is the reference. Women made
up 47.5% of the sample, and the average age was 37. About 27% of the sample are doctors, and
the villages on average deliver information on health more than 3 times a year. We also have
information on chronic disease (such as Hypertension, Heart diseases, Nephritis, and Diabetes),
other serious diseases (hepatitis A, hepatitis B, phthisis, AIDS, schistosomiasis), and activities of
daily living (ADLs: cleaning yards, bowing and bending knees, bathing, feeding, dressing, getting
out of bed) for each individual in 2007. Specifically, 7.5% of the sample suffer from a chronic
disease. One half of the rural inhabitants in the sample have a primary school education or less.
The proportion of laborers was around 55%. The percent of minority ethnic households was
about 10% of the sample, which corresponds to the official statistics. Differences were observed
between the samples: among non-participants and the non-exposed the percent of minority ethnic
households was more than 15%. Average household size was around 4 members. On average,
8
households included at least one member below the age of 10 years, and at least one over the age
of 65 years. In China, the size of the household is restrained by the one-child policy. While in
rural areas, the policy constraint is less strictly enforced than in urban contexts, households still
face monetary penalties according to the number of excess children. Moreover, children are quite
often raised by their grandparents. For reasons related to finances, tradition, and registration
permits (‘hukou”)5, the children remain in their hometown and may be a source of concern for
their elderly caretakers.
Wubao individuals are those classified as under the poverty line as defined by the local gov-
ernment. They are then eligible for public policies aimed at helping the poor. They made up
around 0.2% of our sample. Similarly, 18% of villages were considered pingkun, meaning that the
village as a whole was under the poverty line as defined by the local government. In such cases,
the whole village is eligible for governmental help, which can be financial or involve infrastructure
improvements. Thirty-eight percent of villages were classified as xiaokan by the local government.
These villages possess enough wealth to be above the poverty line defined by the local government.
6 Fifteen percent of the households lived in the suburbs and 14% were located in a “township”.
87% of the towns are in areas administratively defined as “agricultural regions”. In topographical
terms, half of the villages are located in hill or mountain areas.
The data presented in Table 3, Columns (1) to (3) also shed some light on the differences
between the insured, non-participants and non-exposed rural inhabitants. Since the number of
counties and households participating in the program increased over time, 2006 includes more
observations for the insured group, while for 2003 there are more for the non-exposed group.
To ensure that the values of the variables, which may change over time, is comparable between
these three groups, we focus on their values in 2003. Subscribing households generally had higher
income and include fewer members who are older than 65 or younger than 10. The heads of these
households were slightly older, more educated, less likely to be female, single, or a non-agricultural
worker. They were also more likely to include members of the Communist Party, and less likely to
be members of a minority or in poverty (wubao). Among non-participants and the non-exposed
the percentage of ethnic minority households was more than 15%, but in the insured group it was
under 10%. Villages in NCMS counties were also much richer and had fewer clinics but a higher
5Migrant workers’ children have very limited access to public schools in the regions where they work
6The criteria defined by individual local governments for classification as wubao, xiaokan and pingkun are set
up at the local government level and they are highly variable.
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rate of child vaccination than those in non-NCMS counties. They also included fewer migrants,
more laborers, had higher average education levels and were less likely to be located in mountain,
western or central areas.
4 Econometric Strategy
The subject of our modeling is the response to the survey question ”How do you assess your
health?”, where answers range from very bad health (coded as 1) to excellent health (coded as
5) on a five-point scale. Y is measured on a discrete ordinal scale. We use an ordered probit
model. Our empirical analyses exploit the quasi-natural experiment arising from the introduction
of NCMS programs to examine their effect on the self-assessed health of individuals. As mentioned
above, each period includes three types of households: participants in the NCMS program, non-
participants within NCMS counties, and non-exposed households located in non-NCMS counties.
To learn how the introduction of the insurance program affected individual self-assessed health,
we begin by applying the difference-in-difference (DID) framework. More specifically, the effects of
the NCMS are identified through differences between insured and uninsured households in changes
in SAH over the time periods before and after the local launch of the NCMS. The advantage of
this double-difference framework is to eliminate time-invariant selection bias. This is crucial in
the present context because participation in the program is voluntary, meaning that households
which chose not to participate may differ from participants in both observable and unobservable
characteristics. Moreover, program distribution over counties may be non-random. As a result, the
members of insured and uninsured households may have had differing SAH even in the absence of
the NCMS. The double-difference method can deliver unbiased and consistent estimates as long as
the changes in household SAH over time would have been parallel were there no NCMS. Sufficient
conditions are: (a) that trends in period-specific unobservables are the same in treatment and
control groups, and (b) the expected change in idiosyncratic errors is zero for both the treated
and untreated. Hence the claim that double differencing makes it possible to estimate the impact
of a program if the unobservables that differ between the treated and the untreated are time-
invariant (Wagstaff et al., 2009).
The introduction of the NCMS program may have had two types of effects: one, that of insur-
ance coverage, has been widely studied in the health insurance literature. The other is the effect
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of the introduction of a large-scale public insurance program, and other concomitant changes in
healthcare provision, on both, participants and non-participants. Indeed, the introduction of the
NCMS coincided with other relevant changes: in particular, governments implemented support-
ing policies to improve the quality and delivery of healthcare services. In addition, anecdotal
evidence indicates that the price of healthcare services increased after the introduction of the
NCMS (Mao, 2005). To identify the insurance effect of the program, which results only from
the insurance coverage itself and excludes the effects of the aforementioned contemporary policies
and changes, we use the double difference method to estimate the difference between participants
and non-participants in NCMS counties, because both groups were affected by these changes. By
contrast, the double difference between non-participants and the non-exposed yields what we call
the spillover effect of the NCMS on non-participants. Refinements such as matching DID and
tests of the identification assumptions are discussed in Section 6.
4.1 Difference-in-Difference Model
To facilitate understanding, we first present the model where the treatment is participation in
the program given that the county has enrolled. The regression model for the double-difference
comparison between participants and non-participants is as follows:
Y ∗ihjt = βXihjt + γHHinsuredht + τtTt + δHHh + 
1
ihjt (1)
HHinsuredht = 1 if the household h partipates to the NCMS program at the year t such as t > t0 (2)
where Y ∗ihjt represents the SAH of individual i of household h located in village j in period t.
Here, t0 is the year just before the first year of the household’s participation. HHinsuredht is
the binary variable that indicates whether household h has subscribed to the NCMS in year t. Tt
includes three year dummies that control for the trend over time that is common to all groups. This
assumption of a common trend for all groups is discussed in the Robustness section. HHh includes
all the household indicators. HHh controls for all time-invariant household characteristics. Xihjt
includes observable individual variables that vary over time and may affect SAH (See Table 3 for
details). γ represents insurance coverage effects, as it shows the difference in outcomes between
participants and non-participants.
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We now include the non-exposed.
Y ∗ihjt = βXihjt + γHHinsuredht + τtTt + δHHh + κCountyEnrolledjt + 
2
ihjt (3)
CountyEnrolledjt = 1 if the county j enrolled in the NCMS program at the year t such as t > tt0 (4)
Here, tt0 is the year just before the year of the county’s enrollment. The SUTVA assumption
is discussed in the Results section. κ gives the spillover effects of the NCMS program showing
the difference in outcome between the non-exposed and non-participants.
4.2 Results: NCMS Insurance Program
We now present the results on differences in dynamic changes in individual SAH. The difference-
in-difference (DID) model applies a fixed-effect regression that controls for fixed effects of county,
household and year. All the time-invariant effects of household characteristics are controlled by
household fixed effects. In our context, the program is voluntary and households chose whether
or not to participate. All the time-invariant effects of county characteristics are controlled by the
county fixed effects. Similarly, enrollment in the NCMS program was not compulsory for counties.
Counties chose whether or not to enroll. Note that households did not change county during our
period of observation. Hence, there was colinearity between county fixed effects and household
fixed effects. We thus only consider the household fixed effects that include the county fixed
effects. On average (or median), household fixed effects are computed on 14 observations. The
yearly time trend in SAH that is common to all individuals is controlled for with year fixed effects.
The reference is a NCMS non-exposed man aged between 20 and 30 years old, non-educated, in
2003, living in a non-governmental township, in eastern and plains areas.
Controlling for the selection issue changes the results on the coverage effect and the spillover
effect (Table 4, Columns (1) versus (2)). When no selection bias is considered, coverage appears
to deteriorate subjective health, whereas the presence of general public health insurance leads
to an improvement in SAH. Taking selection bias into account leads to a reversal of the cover-
age effect of the NCMS program: household NCMS subscription improves individual SAH. The
spillover effect of the NCMS program does not significantly affect self-reported health. To sum
up, after controlling for differences in county (household) characteristics according to the year of
NCMS program introduction (NCMS household enrollment), a household’s coverage by the NCMS
improves perceived health.
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The amount of time that has passed since the NCMS program was launched may impact its
spillover effect on SAH. In the first year following its launch, the NCMS may have had a lesser
impact than the following years. Several explanations may be advanced for this observation: as
the years pass, increasing interest in health, increasing trust in the NCMS program, 7 as well
as improvement in the community’s feelings of satisfaction with respect to public provision of
healthcare and healthcare access (by central and local governments) through the NCMS program.
We then allow for the possibility that the average treatment effect varies over the course of the
implementation cycle of the NCMS program by considering an additional effect: number of years
following the first year of county NCMS enrollment. Columns (3) and (5) give the results of this
analysis. There is a highly significant positive association between seniority of NCMS county
enrollment and self-assessed health. This additional effect dominates the overall spillover effect of
the NCMS program.
Similarly, the decision to subscribe may affect the coverage effect on SAH. To assess how this
effect varies over time, we also consider an additional variable, distinguishing the years after a
household subscribes from the NCMS subscription by itself. This seniority effect is comparable
to an intensive margin effect. Columns (4) and (5) give the results of this analysis. The seniority
of household NCMS subscription (more than one year) has no effect on the SAH. Therefore, what
really matters is the fact of subscribing, and not the length of subscription. In other words, there
is an extensive margin but no intensive margin.
The model now controls for both the seniority of the launch of the NCMS program and the
seniority of the NCMS household subscription (Column (6)). The seniority of household NCMS
subscription (more than one year) still has no significant additional effect beyond the overall
coverage effect. Therefore, the length of a household’s coverage by the NCMS program does not
improve self-reported health. One explanation is the high correlation between the coverage effect
and county enrollment after one year. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, from 2004, when a county had
enrolled in the NCMS program, the percentage of subscribing households jumped to around 90%.
The spillover effect increases with the seniority of the county’s enrollment in the NCMS program.
Hence, the earlier the county enrolled in the NCMS program, the stronger the effect.
7Indeed, different local health insurance programs had previously been launched, with poor results in terms
of improving healthcare access. As a result, public health insurance programs were widely considered to be
untrustworthy.
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5 Robustness
The results of the robustness tests are presented in Table 5.
To test whether the identification assumption of the baseline model holds, we apply the same
model to alternative samples. The primary concern with the baseline model is that households
that enrolled in the NCMS may not be comparable to households that did not. Particularly, we
are aware that households that had not joined by 2007 8may have already been covered by other
insurance policies or had very specific concerns regarding participation. Therefore, in sample B,
we excluded counties that had not participated by 2007. Given that the program was first piloted
in July 2003, we exclude observations for 2003 from counties that launched the program in 2003,
in order to avoid complications resulting from the start of the NCMS in the middle of that year.
As a result, the year 2003 can be treated as the year where no counties introduced the NCMS:
sample C. However, the counties that enrolled in 2003 were selected by the central government
on economic and social criteria. The year 2003 was an introductory period for this reform. These
counties may have some specific characteristics that are not well captured by the DID method. In
sample D, data from 2003-enrolled counties are eliminated for all years.
In this paper, we use an ordered probit model with fixed effects. As mentioned above, household
fixed effects are computed on an average/median of 14 observations. However, for some households,
the data includes only 2-5 observations. Therefore, we may have an incidental parameters problem.
One robustness check is to run the same model using only data from households with more than
14 observations. We call this sample E.
Analyses with different samples (Sample B, Sample C, Sample D, Sample E) confirmed the
extensive margin effect. In all samples, the intensive margin has no effect on subjective health.
The other factor whose effect is consistent for all the samples, is the spillover effect for villages in
NCMS counties with seniority of enrollment.
In the literature on the effects of NCMS, authors such as Wagstaff (2009) consider the adverse
selection issue—i.e., the possibility that insured individuals have specific characteristics that dif-
fer from those of non-subscribers. Table A.1 in the appendix gives the regression of household
participation decisions against observable household characteristics. This analysis confirmed that
8The data also contains information on subscriptions for the year 2007
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most of the differences in household characteristics are significant. Table A.1 also displays the
regression of the county enrollment. Part of the differences in county and village characteristics
are significant . Moreover, the evidence for adverse selection is mixed: the participation rate
increases with the share of members with good or fair health status, when the reference group is
the share of members with excellent health status; however, participation rate actually declines
when the share of members with bad health status rises.
We couple the DID approach with matching to reduce the selection bias on the observables.
The matching method can address two types of potential biases in the baseline method: bias
caused by difference in the supports of the observable covariates between treated and untreated
groups, and bias due to the difference between the two groups in the distribution of the related
observables over their common support (Smith and Todd, 2005). The matching method applied
here is propensity score matching. We estimate the propensity score in two steps. First, in each
year, we estimate the probability of household enrollment in the villages where the county has
launched the program. This is estimated on the basis of households in the NCMS counties. We
predict the probability of enrollment of households in non-NCMS counties on the basis of this
estimate. Second, we estimate the probability of county enrollment in the NCMS in each year.
For both steps, a probit model is estimated. For the comparison between the insured and non-
participants, the probability predicted in the first step is the propensity score used in the matching.
For the comparison between the insured and non-exposed, both the similarity between households
and that between counties must be considered; hence, the (composite) propensity score in each
year, i.e., the product of the two probabilities predicted from the aforementioned two steps, is
used in the matching estimation. Figure A1 shows the histogram for the (composite) propensity
scores for the three groups: the insured, non-participants, and non-exposed. As expected, the
distribution of the propensity score is more skewed to the right for the insured than for non-
participants. Nonetheless, the region of common support is adequate. The propensity score
distribution for the non-exposed is more skewed to the left than the one for non-participants
because of the lower possibility of county enrollment.
Given that we are considering more than two periods, the traditional DID matching method
requires modification. We first estimate the insurance effect in each year from 2004 to 2006. Then
we also determine an alternative measure: a weighted average of the insurance effect over these
three years calculated by weighting the effect in each year on the basis of the ratio of the number
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of treated in that year to the total number of treated over the three years. The standard errors
are bootstrapped with 100 replications. For each year, we use five-nearest-neighbor matching with
replacement and caliper 0.01, and impose a common support condition. The distance between the
propensity scores is measured by the Mahalanobis metric. We confirm that the results are not
sensitive to the number of neighbors (including 3 and 10) or the choice of caliper (including 0.005
and 0.0025). Another complication here is whether to consider experienced participants (those
who are in their second or later year of enrollment in the NCMS) among the treated. To test
the robustness of our results, we also study the case where all the experienced participants are
excluded. In this case, we focus on the first-year effect of the NCMS on the SAH.
To summarize, Case 1 : On the whole sample, probabilities are computed year by year. Case 2 :
On the whole sample, a weighted average of the insurance effect is computed. Case 3 : Excluding
all the experienced participants, probabilities are computed year by year. Case 4 : Excluding all
the experienced participants, a weighted average of the insurance effect is computed.
In all cases, the result with the DID matching model is the same. NCMS household subscrip-
tions improve individual subjective health but seniority has no effect. A spillover effect is also
observed but this effect depends on the duration of county enrollment: the effect of the NCMS
program increases with the time that the county has been enrolled in the NCMS.
Furthermore, we assume a common trend for all groups, attributing any difference in trends
between the treatment and control groups that co-occur with the NCMS program to the program.
This assumption may be debatable, so we attempt to check its robustness on the results by
performing a placebo test using a ”fake” treatment group. Here, we present the results for the
year 2005. The ”fake” treatment group is the 2006-NCMS-households (i.e. households who had
not yet subscribed in 2005) and the control group is the group of households without NCMS in
2006 (and thus also without NCMS in 2005). On this analysis there is no significant effect of the
NCMS program. Hence, our original DID is not biased (results are available on request).
We also make the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which implies that i) the
treatment status of any county does not affect the potential outcomes of another county (non-
interference); ii) the treatments for all counties are comparable (no variation in treatment). The
supply side may be thought to change in non-treated areas because of the attraction of suppliers
to NCMS-counties due to the increase in affordability of the healthcare for the NCMS-insured.
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Thus, as a robustness check, we control for supply side variables. The results are shown in Table
4, last column. We then compare the NCMS effect with and without this control (Columns (5)
and (6)). The absence of change in the NCMS effects suggests that the SUTVA assumption is
valid.
6 Individual Characteristics and Geographical Effects
This section presents an overview of determinants of individual subjective health. Readers who
are interested only in NCMS program effects may skip this section. Results are presented in
Table 6. First, as expected, age has a negative effect on health index.9 Women’s self-assessed
health tends to be poorer than that of men. Being single also decreases health status. This could
be due to greater feelings of insecurity or due to taking less care of their health. The survey
includes questions regarding individual physical health and individual health behavior. SAH is
worse when the individual suffers from a chronic disease or common serious illnesses (hepatitis A,
hepatitis B, phthisis, AIDS, schistosomiasis).10 We tested the effects of variables such as social
class and labor market status to capture individuals’ economic and financial status. Working
in the industrial sector or having a non-agricultural job significantly improves SAH. The model
reveals that education and income are strongly correlated with self-assessed health. The higher
an individual’s level of education, the better their health. This correlation partially results from
an ”age cross education” effect, with older respondents being less educated on average due to
increasing access to secondary and higher education over the past thirty years. Higher household
income is associated with better perceived health.11
Because of colinearity problems, focusing on the effects of the geographical variables and
household variables requires to regress the model without county fixed effects and household fixed
effects. The results are displayed in Table 6.
Perceived health deteriorates with increasing household size. This may be explained by family
composition. As explained above, the children of internal migrants remain in their hometown,
9As is well-known, in China there is massive internal migration of healthy 15- to 45-year-olds from rural to
urban areas. Because of missing healthy people aged between 15 and 45 years, a polynomial specification for age
is not relevant here. The results of the model with polynomial specification for age are available on request.
10The data does not provide detailed information on these pathologies.
11Here we do not test the income-related heterogeneity in self-assessed health.
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i.e. their village, with their grandparents. This may also be a cause of worry or fatigue in elderly
grandparents.12 SAH worsens with the number of old people (over 65 years old) in the family and
with the number of young people (less than 10 years old) in the family.
Members of ethnic minorities are more likely to report being in bad health. Even after control-
ling for the level of village income and village status (as being under the poverty line as defined
by the province), minority status remains a significantly associated with worse health status. Be-
ing a very poor family as defined by the local government (wubao household) has no significant
effect after controlling for household income and for being in a pingkun village (or not). A village
classified as pingkun by the local government receives some subsidies. Higher household income
is associated with better perceived health.
Moreover, having a doctor in the household or a household member with training in primary
care is not associated with better perceived health. In contrast, having a cadre of the Communist
Party in the household makes individuals more optimistic on their own health. A household
member having a party position might help other household members to get a job and to resolve
certain issues involving local government.
The estimated coefficient of living in an agricultural region on reported health is positive,
whereas living in a “townships” deteriorates self-assessed health. Township areas offer more
healthcare facilities and/or more access to healthcare facilities, but the price of healthcare is
also higher than in the countryside. Furthermore, some other elements whose aim is to improve
healthcare access are associated with this program. These include the expansion of healthcare
facilities, free health examinations (in general, one per year), and medical training education. The
presence and extent of these elements depends on decisions of the local government, and their
effects are unclear. While vaccinations for children improve individual health, the effect of free
clinical examinations and health training education are more ambiguous. Having access to more
information on health status may also make people more aware of their health problems.
7 Conclusion
During the 2003-2006 period, subjective health status in Chinese rural areas improved. We use
a data for these years from a household longitudinal survey to analyze how the introduction of
12The children of internal migrant workers have very limited access to public schools in the areas where their
parents work.
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an insurance system, known as New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), contributed to this
change. The health insurance program was launched sequentially over counties beginning in 2003,
and households voluntarily choose whether participate in the program after it has been launched by
their county. These facts make it feasible to disentangle two channels of influence of the NCMS on
self-reported health status: one is the insurance effect of the coverage, which can be estimated by
comparing insured households with non-participants in counties that have launched the program
(NCMS counties); the other is the general equilibrium effect that affects all residents of NCMS
counties, which can estimated by comparing non-participants to non-exposed households (located
in counties where the program has not been implemented). The longitudinal data also allow us to
examine how the effect changes with the duration of households’ subscription to the program. In
this paper, the variable of interest is the subjective health in itself. We do not consider subjective
health as a proxy of objective health. We focus here on perceived individual health, a determinant
of demand for healthcare access and treatment.
The empirical findings include, first, a positive extensive margin: individuals feel better about
their health status when they are covered by the NCMS. However, there is no intensive margin:
there is no additional gain in self-assess of health status when the individual enrolls in the program
for more years. Second, we find a positive general equilibrium effect of introducing the NCMS
program on non-participants in the NCMS county, which accumulates over time.
Third, besides the insurance program, household composition (family size, number of young
and old members) and socio-economic status (income, occupation, and education) also have strong
effects on the self-evaluation of health status. Not only is larger household size associated with
worse self-assessed health, but the composition of the household also has an effect: a larger number
of old people is associated with worse perceived health, while the number of young people has a
significantly positive association with perceived health. Both education and income have an effect
on SAH. A high level of education and a relatively high income lead to a better perceived health.
Controlling for wealth and geographical area, it turns out that ethnicity still has an impact: Being
part of a minority has a significant negative effect on self-reported health. Having a position in
the Communist Party has a positive effect on subjective health.
Our findings focus on the role of the NCMS program in improvement in SAH in Chinese
rural areas. Understanding the effect of the implementation of a health insurance system on self-
reported health may help policy makers to design insurance schemes with increased participation
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rates and ensure that rural populations gain better access to health services and enjoy greater
protection against the cost of illness.
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Table	  1:	  Participation	  rate	  in	  different	  years	  
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 or later 
County participation 
Cumulative enrollment rate 16.4%	   32.1%	   45.7%	   77.1%	   100% 
 	   	   	   	    
Household participation 
Cumulative enrollment rate 9.5%	   23.8%	   40.0%	   72.3%	   100%	  
 	   	   	   	    
Participation rate in NCMS counties 63.7%	   79.8%	   87.0%	   94.6%	    
Exposure rate 83.2%	   66.8%	   51.2%	   22.0%	    
 	   	   	   	    
Cumulative participation rate in counties that 
launched the NCMS in 2003 63.7%	   82.1%	   94.4%	   97.4%	   100% 
Cumulative participation rate in counties that 
launched the NCMS in 2004 	   75.8%	   93.9%	   95.0%	   100% 
Cumulative participation rate in counties that 
launched the NCMS in 2005 	   	   71.2%	   87.0%	   100% 
Cumulative participation rate in counties that 
launched the NCMS in 2006 	   	   	   96.2%	   100% 	  	  	  
Table	  2:	  Self-­reported	  Health	  Status	  	  	   All	  years	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	  Part	  I	   	   	   	   	   	  Health	  category	   	   	   	   	   	  Very	  bad:	  1	  credits	   1.84 1.71 1.85 1.93 1.84 Bad:	  2	  credits	   3.03 2.96 2.98 3.08 3.11 Fair:	  3	  credits	   7.55 7.91 7.79 7.25 7.27 Good:	  4	  credits	   34.43 36.64 34.58 33.78 32.93 Excellent:	  5	  credits	   53.15 50.78 52.8 53.96 54.85 Mean	  value	   4.34	   4.32	   4.33	   4.35	   4.36	   Number	  of	  observations	   71866 16892	   18099	   18301 18574 	   	   	   	   	   	  Part	  II	   	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  value	  of	  self-­‐reported	  health	  status	   	   	   	   	   	  Insured	   4.37	   4.32	   4.33	   4.36	   4.38	   Non-­‐participants	   4.39	   4.25	   4.27	   4.42	   4.48	   Non-­‐exposed	   4.33	   4.34	   4.34	   4.33	   4.27	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Proportion	  of	  individuals	  with	  fair	  or	  worse	  health	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Insured	   12.1% 13.6%	   13.5% 11.8% 11.7% Non-­‐participants	   11.5% 13.7%	   13.6% 10.5% 10.2% Non-­‐exposed	   12.5% 11.9% 12.2% 12.8% 14.2% 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  Three	  Groups	  Variable	   Villages	  within	  NCMS	  counties	   Villages	  within	  non-­‐NCMS	  counties	  	   Whole	  sample	  	   Insured	   Non-­‐participants	   Non-­‐exposed	   	  
	   Based	  on	  year	  2003	  
Years	  
2003-­2006	  
	   	  (1)	   	  (2)	   	  	  	  (3)	   	  (4)	  Woman	   47.8%	   46.5%	   47.4%	   47.5%	  
Age	   37.6	   37.3	   36.5	   36.9	  
Serious	  disease	   0.6%	   0.5%	   0.6%	   0.6%	  
Chronic	  disease	   7.2%	   4.6%	   7.8%	   7.5%	  
Household	  size	   4.6	   4.6	   4.6	   4.6	  
Percent	  of	  members	  older	  than	  65	   33.0%	   40.0%	   32.0%	   32.7%	  
Percent	  of	  members	  younger	  than	  10	   47.0%	   48.0%	   49.0%	   48.1%	  
Age	  of	  head	  of	  household	   51.7	   50.2	   50.5	   50.9	  
Head's	  years	  of	  education	   6.7	   6.5	   6.5	   6.6	  
Female	  head	   4.9%	   6.2%	   8.5%	   7.1%	  
Single	  head	   7.1%	   10.5%	   9.1%	   33.9%	  
Head	  in	  industry	  sector	   36.6%	   42.4%	   33.1%	   34.8%	  
Having	  communist	  members	   17.0%	   10.0%	   15.0%	   15.7%	  
Having	  communist	  cadres	   9.0%	   6.6%	   8.9%	   8.8%	  
Including	  doctors	  or	  individuals	  with	  medical	  	  training	  	   21.1%	   19.6%	   29.5%	   26.1%	  
Minority	  household	   8.7%	   17.1%	   15.2%	   13.0%	  
Wubao	  household	   0.2%	   0.3%	   0.2%	   0.2%	  
Village	  average	  income	  per	  capita	  in	  2003	   4014.6	   3812.2	   3083.0	   3446.1	  
Township	   15.1%	   10.7%	   13.9%	   14.2%	  
Surburb	   14.1%	   7.7%	   14.0%	   13.8%	  
Xiaokan	   36.3%	   20.6%	   37.0%	   36.0%	  
Pingkun	   7.8%	   5.5%	   9.5%	   8.7%	  
Number	  of	  clinics	  in	  2003	   129.0%	   124.0%	   129.0%	   132.6%	  
Deliver	  information	  on	  health	  more	  than	  3	  times	  a	  year	   60.1%	   72.7%	   57.4%	   59.1%	  
Share	  of	  children	  vaccinated	  in	  2003	   97.2	   98.7	   97.4	   97.1	  
Share	  of	  migrants	  in	  2003	   23.2%	   22.1%	   25.2%	   24.3%	  
Share	  of	  laborers	  in	  the	  village	   57.0%	   54.5%	   53.6%	   54.9%	  
Share	  of	  laborers	  with	  primary	  school	  level	  or	  below	   46.3%	   51.3%	   48.8%	   48.1%	  Share	  of	  laborers	  with	  high	  school	  degree	  or	  above	  in	  the	  village	   33.8%	   31.1%	   30.2%	   31.5%	  
Mountain	  area	   47.4%	   50.6%	   57.8%	   53.7%	  
Highland	  area	   24.5%	   18.4%	   23.2%	   23.5%	  
Western	  area	   22.4%	   20.9%	   29.3%	   26.5%	  
Central	  area	   43.3%	   35.6%	   47.7%	   45.6%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  4:	  Ordered	  Probit	  Model	  with	  Fixed	  Effects	  (Dependent	  variable:	  SAH)	  
	  	   (1)@ (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Woman	   -­‐0.094***	   -­‐0.218***	   -­‐0.218***	   -­‐0.218***	   -­‐0.218***	   -­‐0.218***	  	   (0.010)	   (0.013)	   (0.013)	   (0.013)	   (0.013)	   (0.013)	  Age	   -­‐0.032***	   -­‐0.053***	   -­‐0.053***	   -­‐0.053***	   -­‐0.053***	   -­‐0.053***	  	   (0.000)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	  Single	   -­‐0.339***	   -­‐0.482***	   -­‐0.481***	   -­‐0.484***	   -­‐0.482***	   -­‐0.482***	  	   (0.013)	   (0.021)	   (0.021)	   (0.021)	   (0.021)	   (0.021)	  Serious	  disease	   -­‐0.414***	   -­‐0.319**	   -­‐0.320**	   -­‐0.319**	   -­‐0.320**	   -­‐0.321**	  	   (0.075)	   (0.131)	   (0.131)	   (0.131)	   (0.131)	   (0.132)	  Chronic	  disease	   -­‐0.462***	   -­‐0.261	   -­‐0.260	   -­‐0.261	   -­‐0.261	   -­‐0.261	  	   (0.105)	   (0.161)	   (0.161)	   (0.161)	   (0.161)	   (0.161)	  Edu.	  3	  to	  6	  yrs	   0.314***	   0.427***	   0.426***	   0.426***	   0.426***	   0.426***	  	   (0.015)	   (0.023)	   (0.023)	   (0.023)	   (0.023)	   (0.023)	  Edu.	  7	  to	  9	  yrs	   0.453***	   0.623***	   0.622***	   0.622***	   0.621***	   0.621***	  	   (0.016)	   (0.025)	   (0.025)	   (0.025)	   (0.025)	   (0.025)	  Edu:	  more	  than	  9	   0.577***	   0.772***	   0.769***	   0.769***	   0.768***	   0.768***	  
 (0.022)	   (0.033)	   (0.033)	   (0.033)	   (0.033)	   (0.033)	  Non	  agri.	  Self-­‐employed	   0.143***	   -­‐0.068*	   -­‐0.071*	   -­‐0.069*	   -­‐0.070*	   -­‐0.071*	  	   (0.026)	   (0.036)	   (0.036)	   (0.036)	   (0.036)	   (0.036)	  Non	  agr.	  Employees	   0.046**	   0.115***	   0.113***	   0.114***	   0.114***	   0.114***	  	   (0.024)	   (0.034)	   (0.034)	   (0.034)	   (0.034)	   (0.034)	  Non	  agri.	  other	   0.026	   -­‐0.152***	   -­‐0.152***	   -­‐0.153***	   -­‐0.152***	   -­‐0.153***	  	   (0.023)	   (0.034)	   (0.034)	   (0.034)	   (0.034)	   (0.034)	  Work	  in	  industry	  	   0.065***	   0.164***	   0.165***	   0.165***	   0.165***	   0.166***	  	   (0.021)	   (0.030)	   (0.030)	   (0.030)	   (0.030)	   (0.030)	  NCMS	  HH	  	   -­‐0.107***	   0.116***	   0.098**	   0.147***	   0.095**	   0.065**	  subscription	   (0.025)	   (0.042)	   (0.042)	   (0.025)	   (0.045)	   (0.033)	  Seniority	  of	  NCMS-­‐HH	  subscription	  	   	   	  0.066	   	   0.023	   0.025	  	  	   	  	   	   (0.051)	   	  	   	  (0.013)	   (0.041)	  NCMS	  County	  	   0.177***	   0.051	   0.058	   0.038	   0.041	   0.058	  enrollment	   (0.024)	   (0.041)	   (0.042)	   (0.041)	   (0.042)	   (0.042)	  Seniority	  of	  NCMS-­‐county	  enrollment	   	   	  0.182***	   0.163***	   0.162***	  	  	   	  	   	   	  	   (0.026)	   (0.043)	   (0.043)	  No.	  Clinics	   	   	   	   	   	   0.004	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.015)	  Child	  vaccins	   	   	   	   	   	   0.002***	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.001)	  Medical	  exams	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.002**	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.001)	  Free	  medical	  prevention	  training	   	   	   	   0.003	  
 	   	   	   	   	   (0.005)	  Year	  Fixed	  Effects	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Household	  Fixed	  Effects	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Standard	  errors	  are	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  Significant	  at	  10%;	  **significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  5%.	  	  @:	  No	  control	  for	  the	  selection	  issue	  (no	  fixed	  effects	  (years	  and	  households)).	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Table	  5:	  Test	  of	  robustness	  	  
	  
 NCMS household 
subscription 
Seniority of NCMS 
HH subscription 
NCMS county 
enrollment 
Seniority of NCMS 
county enrollment 
 
DinD Model 
 
Sample B 0.147*** (0.036) 0.023 (0.028) 0.039 (0.028) 0.159*** (0.026)  
 0.97** (0.034)   0.036* (0.019) 0.187*** (0.027)  
Sample C 0.133*** (0.035) 0.024 (0.027) 0.044 (0.042) 0.146***  (0.034)  
 0.088*** (0.043)   0.041 (0.044) 0.146*** (0.035) 
Sample D 0.123*** (0.049) 0.039 (0.028) 0.022 (0.038)   0.133*** (0.035)  
 0.090*** (0.041)   0.018 (0.045)  0.153*** (0.035)  
Sample E 0.102*** (0.036) 0.054 (0.044) 0.032 (0.038) 0.125*** (0.021) 
 0.128*** (0.036)   0.053 (0.036) 0.087*** (0.038) 
 
DinD Matching Model 
 
Case 1 0.084*** (0.046) 0.006*** (0.000) 0.015 (0.068) 0.067* (0.041) 
 0.089*** (0.046)   0.019 (0.068) 0.040* (0.021) 
Case 2 0.076 (0.045) -0.002* (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.104*** (0.036) 
 0.060* (0.028)   0.009 (0.007) 0.068*** (0.020) 
Case 3 0.067** (0.031) 0.051 (0.059) 0.028 (0.045) 0.134*** (0.001) 
 0.071** (0.037)   0.044 (0.042) 0.133*** (0.024) 
Case 4 0.084** (0.005) 0.040 (0.055) 0.029 (0.027) 0.108*** (0.000) 
 0.102* (0.054)   0.027 (0.030) 0.095*** (0.021) Standard	  errors	  are	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%	  ;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%	  ;	  ***	  significant	  at	  5%.	  Estimation	  results	  on	  control	  variables	  are	  not	  reported	  in	  this	  table.	  Regressions	  based	  on	  the	  set	  of	  variables	  presented	  Table	  4,	  Columns(4)	  and	  (5).
Table	  6:	  Determinants	  of	  SAH	  (Dependent	  variable	  :SAH_)	  
	  Woman	   -­‐0.114***	   Industry	  sector	   0.047	   Suburb	   -­‐0.223***	  	   (0.013)	   	   (0.037)	   	   (0.039)	  Age	   -­‐0.032***	   HH	  size	   -­‐0.002	   Live	  in	  township	   0.139***	  	   (0.001)	   	   (0.012)	   	   (0.039)	  Single	   -­‐0.330***	   No.	  of	  clinics	   0.050***	   Agricultural	  area	   0.096***	  	   (0.025)	   	   (0.014)	   	   (0.037)	  Serious	  disease	   -­‐0.321***	   Child	  vaccins	   0.006***	   HH	  member:	  w/communist	  card	   -­‐0.016	  	   (0.097)	   	   (0.001)	   	   (0.038)	  Chronic	  disease	   -­‐0.382***	   Free	  exams	   -­‐0.001	   HH	  member:	  w/communist	  party	  cadre	   0.055**	  	   (0.037)	   	   (0.001)	   	   (0.026)	  Edu.	  3	  to	  6	  yrs	   0.253***	   Health	  edu.	  training	   -­‐0.005	   HH	  member:	  w/medical	  knowledge	   0.107	  	   (0.027)	   	   (0.004)	   	   (0.088)	  Edu.	  7	  to	  9	  yrs	   0.381***	   HH	  Log(Income)	   0.109***	   HH	  Minority	   -­‐0.122***	  	   (0.029)	   	   (0.020)	   	   (0.039)	  Edu:	  more	  than	  9	   0.464***	   Xiaokan	  village	   -­‐0.060**	   No.	  young	  in	  HH	   -­‐0.052**	  	   (0.040)	   	   (0.029)	   	   (0.023)	  Non	  agri.	  Self-­‐employed	   0.109**	   Pingkun	  village	   0.064	   No.	  old	  in	  HH	   -­‐0.070***	  	   (0.046)	   	   (0.049)	   	   (0.022)	  Non	  agr.	  Employees	   0.061	   Log(village	  income)	   0.237***	   	   	  	   (0.042)	   	   (0.031)	   	   	  Non	  agri.	  other	   -­‐0.020	   	   	   	   	  	   (0.041)	   	   	   	   	  	  Standard	  error	  are	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  significant	  at	  10%	  ;	  **significant	  at	  5%	  ;	  ***	  significant	  at	  5%.	  	  	  
The	  specificity	  of	  the	  age	  variable	  	  Under	  the	  age	  of	  15	  years,	  health	  self-­‐assessment	  may	  be	  debatable.	  Individuals	  may	  be	  too	  young	  to	  self-­‐assess	  themselves.	  Dropping	  these	  observations	  does	  not	  change	  the	  results.	  We	  also	  regress	  the	  model	  with	  age	  divided	  into	  groups.	  For	   individuals	  born	  in	  1958-­‐1983,	  we	  divide	  age	   into	  10-­‐year	  categories,	  except	   over	   age	   40	  where	  we	   divide	   into	   5-­‐year	   categories.	   Considering	   age	   group	   dummies	   does	   not	  significantly	   change	   the	   results	   on	   the	   other	   independent	   variables.	  We	   find	   that	   members	   of	   the	   lost	  generation	  are	  more	  optimistic.	  	  The	  lost	  generation	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  birth	  cohorts	  born	  in	  1948-­‐1957.	  Most	  members	  of	  this	  generation	  experienced	  disruptive	  education	  and	  send-­‐down	  policy	  (Hung	  and	  Chiu,	  2003).	  Using	  4-­‐year	  panel	  data	  from	  the	  longitudinal	  National	  Fixed-­‐point	  Survey	  (NFS)	  2003-­‐2006,	  we	  defined	  4	  groups	  of	  age	  following	  Huan	   (2009).	   The	  members	   of	   the	   oldest	   cohort	   (Cohort	   1,	   born	   in	   1943-­‐1947)	   came	   of	   age	   as	   young	  children	   and	   teenagers	   during	   the	  New	   China	   (1949	   People’s	   Republic	   China)	   and	   they	   either	   finished	  their	  high	  school	  education,	  college	  education,	  or	  entered	  the	  urban	  labor	  force	  before	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1966-­‐1976	   Cultural	   Revolution.	   Cohort	   2	   (1948-­‐1952)	   members	   experienced	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	  Cultural	   Revolution,	   in	   which	   send-­‐down	   policy	   was	   applied	   seriously.	   They	   graduated	   from	   junior	   or	  senior	  middle	   schools	   in	   1966,	   1967,	   and	   1968.	   Many	   of	   them	   spent	   5-­‐10	   years	   in	   intensive	   labor	   on	  farmland	   before	   they	  were	   allowed	   to	   return	   to	   the	   cities.	   Cohort	   3	   (1953-­‐1957)	  members	   completed	  secondary	   education	   and	   spent	   a	   few	   years	   in	   the	   countryside	   during	   the	   late	   stages	   of	   the	   Cultural	  Revolution.	   Cohort	   4	   (1958-­‐1962)	   members	   spent	   their	   childhood	   during	   the	   Cultural	   Revolution.	  Disruption	  of	  education	  and	  send-­‐down	  policy	  were	  specific	  to	  Cohorts	  2	  and	  3,	  which	  are	  called	  the	  lost	  generation.	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  A1:	  	  Distribution	  of	  propensity	  scores	  by	  group.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Table	  A.1	  Household	  participation	  decision	  and	  county	  enrollment.	  Household	  participation	  decisiona	   County	  enrollment	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   	   (4)	  0.149***	   0.139***	   0.049	   0.443**	  Log(Income)	   (0.040)	   (0.044)	   (0.054)	   Log(village	  income)	   (0.186)	  -­‐0.002	   0.017	   0.027	   -­‐0.352**	  Household	  size	   (0.017)	   (0.020)	   (0.026)	   Villages	  classified	  as	  xiaokan	   (0.176)	  0.207***	   0.190**	   -­‐0.105	   -­‐0.154	  Share	  of	  members	  with	  good	  health	  in	  2003b	   (0.070)	   (0.080)	   (0.094)	   Villages	  classified	  as	  pingkun	   (0.289)	  0.459***	   0.531***	   0.076	   0.129	  Share	  of	  members	  with	  fair	  or	  worse	  health	  in	  2003	   (0.142)	   (0.159)	   (0.186)	   Suburban	  area	   (0.281)	  -­‐0.868***	   -­‐0.813***	   -­‐0.643***	   -­‐0.254	  Share	  of	  members	  with	  poor	  health	  in	  2003	   (0.169)	   (0.179)	   (0.215)	   Township	   (0.326)	  -­‐0.015	   0.006	   -­‐0.109	   -­‐0.308	  Share	  of	  members	  older	  than	  65	   (0.139)	   (0.148)	   (0.171)	   Agricultural	  villages	   (0.254)	  0.453**	   0.548***	   0.321	   0.153	  Share	  of	  members	  younger	  than	  10	   (0.200)	   (0.207)	   (0.274)	   Log(population)	   (0.145)	  0.114	   0.101	   -­‐0.095	   2.663***	  Share	  of	  migrants	  in	  2003	   (0.132)	   (0.141)	   (0.154)	   Share	  of	  laborers	   (0.766)	  -­‐0.673***	   -­‐0.812***	   -­‐0.019	   0.064	  Minority	   (0.081)	   (0.106)	   (0.216)	   Share	  of	  high	  school	  or	  above	   (0.728)	  -­‐0.690**	   -­‐0.826**	   -­‐1.311***	   -­‐0.228	  	  Wubao	  household	   (0.304)	   (0.355)	   (0.440)	   Share	  of	  migrants	  in	  2003	   (0.482)	  0.216***	   0.119	   0.150	   -­‐0.072	  Household	  with	  communist	  members	   (0.074)	   (0.078)	   (0.095)	   Number	  of	  clinics	  in	  2003	   (0.080)	  0.089	   0.257**	   0.156	   0.013**	  Female	  head	   (0.112)	   (0.116)	   (0.145)	   Share	  of	  children	  vaccinated	  in	  2003	   (0.006)	  0.013***	   0.011***	   0.009***	   -­‐0.470***	  Age	  of	  the	  head	  of	  household	   (0.003)	   (0.003)	   (0.003)	   Mountain	  areas	   (0.180)	  -­‐0.233***	   -­‐0.233***	   -­‐0.221**	   0.535**	  Head	  is	  single	   (0.084)	   (0.087)	   (0.103)	   Highland	  areas	   (0.219)	  -­‐0.024	   0.070	   0.223*	   -­‐0.602**	  Head’s	  years	  of	  education	  3–6a	   (0.101)	   (0.104)	   (0.127)	   Western	  China	   (0.256)	  0.047	   0.166	   0.239*	   -­‐0.334*	  Head’s	  years	  of	  education	  7–9	   (0.108)	   (0.114)	   (0.136)	   Central	  China	   (0.203)	  0.122	   0.230	   0.043	   	  Head’s	  years	  of	  education	  10	  and	  above	   (0.143)	   (0.152)	   (0.175)	   	   	  -­‐0.237***	   -­‐0.286***	   -­‐0.074	   	  Head	  is	  self-­‐employed	  non-­‐farmer	  b	   (0.074)	   (0.086)	   (0.106)	   	   	  0.131*	   0.017	   0.026	   	   	  Head	  is	  an	  employee	   (0.074)	   (0.079)	   (0.093)	   	   	  0.020	   -­‐0.023	   0.184*	   	   	  Head	  works	  in	  other	  non-­‐farm-­‐related	  employment	   (0.071)	   (0.077)	   (0.106)	   	   	  Observations	   6575	   6492	   3960	   Observations	   394	  Likelihood	   -­‐1904	   -­‐1711	   -­‐1154	   Likelihood	   -­‐212.5	  Pseudo	  R2	   0.194	   0.273	   0.406	   Pseudo	  R2	   0.222	  Year	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   	   Yes	  Village	  fixed	  effects	   No	   No	   Yes	   	   No	  Province	  fixed	  effects	   No	   Yes	   No	   	   No	  Control	  for	  Village	  characteristics	  as	  defined	  in	  Column	  (4)	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   	   -­‐	  Note:	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses,	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	  	  a.-­‐	  The	  omitted	  category	  is	  illiteracy	  or	  years	  of	  education	  less	  than	  3.	  	  b.-­‐	  The	  omitted	  category	  is	  farmer.	  The	  regression	  for	  village	  enrollment	  is	  based	  on	  county-­‐level	  data.	  	  	  
